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RECENT HEGEL LITERATURE: THE JENA PERIOD
AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT*
by James Schmidt
Hegel arrived injena early in 1801, freed from his tutorial duties by the inheritance he
received upon the death of his father. There he aided Schelling in the editing of the
Critical Journal of Philosophy, won a post at the university, published a series of long
articles in the Journal and accumulated a pile of lecture notes which have seen the light
of day only in our century. He departed from the town rather hastily in 1807 leaving
behind a university closed as a result of Napoleon's victory over the forces of the Holy
Roman Empire and a book, the Phenomenology of Spirit, finished on the eve of the
battle.
It woi. 1 seem easier to make sense out of Hegel's activities in this period than to
come to grips with his writings from the Berne and Frankfurt periods. There he was
embarked on a project whose outlines are obscure and whose intent is difficult to
recapture. At Jena he had become a systematic philosopher. From Frankfurt we have
but two pages of what seems to be a comprehensive philosophical system. From Jena we
have what will amount to four volumes of system drafts and lecture notes. In his early
period his writing is couched in an odd combination of Tubingen theology, critical
philosophy, and moral psychology. Injena, post-Kantian philosophy wins out. However
clumsy the writings seem, at least the sources for the terms are known: Schelling, Fichte,
and Kant. And above all, the early period ends with a whimper; his theologico-
political treatise is never brought to a coherent conclusion. Jena ends with Napoleon and
a book. Rarely has any period in a thinker's life had such a clearly drawn conclusion.
Matters of course are not as they seem, and difficulties cannot be escaped. First of all
there is the problem of that book. Hegel's attempt to hold out a ladder by which one may
ascend from ordinary knowledge to the Absolute results in a more difficult climb than
his benign metaphor suggests. The ladder sets one off on a rougher trail, which in turn
leads to rock faces, glaciers, sudden storms, and the bleached bones of quite a few
unwary climbers who made the ascent not knowing what they would find in the higher
elevations. Early ascents seemed to assume that if one could find one clear motif — for
Kojeve, the dialectic of master and slave, for Wahl, the unhappy consciousness, for
Heidegger, the discussion of knowledge in the Introduction of the book, for Lukacs, the
discussion of the self-estranged spirit — a safe path to the Absolute might be beaten with
a minimum of difficulties. The less than successful results of these efforts have not
seemed to disuade a few contemporary authors that indeed this is, as advertised, a
propaedeutic and that one can make the climb with little advanced preparation. The
results in the last ten years have been a few more bodies on the higher elevations.
In part the problem may lie in the second apparent advantage the Jena writings have
over the writings of Hegel's theological period. The languages spoken here are
recognizable easily enough, but Hegel's pidgin isn't. Within the System der Sittlichkeit,
for instance, Hegel moves from a set of terms derived from Schelling ("Potenz,"
•This is the second of three article-length reviews of recent Hegel literature.
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"Indifference") to some terms which may or may not be of Kantian origin ("Reflection"
being one of the most problematic), to something which sounds for all the world like the
"real" Hegel (periodic cameos by "Aufhebung"). But perhaps the greatest problem lies
with all of those carefully preserved SystementwIXrfe which span volumes 6-8 of the new
critical edition (with Volume 5 on the way); the pidgin which makes little sense in a
given period becomes absolutely bewildering if traced over time. It is not even enough
that from the earliest hints of the "Jena System" (the 1802 System der Sittlichheit) to the
1807 Phenomenology we have a constant mutation of terminology and organization
from system to system; within the 1803-1804 System der Speculativen Philosophie, we
have a text which is literally a palimpsest. A rewriting and expansion of lectures
delivered at Jena, the system draft consists of a series of fragments which represent a
number of different levels of reworking. Dflsing and Kimmerle, whose edition is the first
to give a faithful representation of the actual state of the manuscripts, have employed as
a basic text a series of sheets on which a three to four centimeter margin is filled with a
fragmentary precis of what appears to be a still more basic text (now lost), a precis which
served as the basis for a further expansion. As Kimmerle has noted in his own study of
Hegel's system of philosophy in this period, if the marginal notes are still within the
identity philosophy he worked out in tandem with Schelling, the expansions and
reworkings already point towards the later Hegel. In short, upon closer examination
one finds that there is no Jena System, but only a set of fragmentary drafts of systems, a
point which holds true for "Hegel's System" as a whole.
If the problems we face in coming to terms with Hegel's Phenomenology and the
works which preceed it are considerable, we can at least take heart in the fact that we are
finally in a reasonable position to know what the problems are and can feel some
measure of certainty about the adequacy of the resources which we have available in
confronting these issues. This is the period for which we have by far the most adequate
editions of Hegel's work, thanks to the work of Otto Poggeler and his collaborators at the
Hegel Archiv in Bochum. Volume 4 of the Gesammelte Werke, available since 1968,
provides a critical edition of the published works from this period: the articles from the
Critical Journal of Philosophy and Hegel's first acknowledged published work, the
monograph from 1801, The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of
Philosophy. Volume 6 contains, as previously mentioned, the extant portions of the
1803-1804 System of Speculative Philosophy (a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of
spirit), Volume 7 contains the Logic, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Nature from the
1804-1805 lecture cycle, while Volume 8 contains the Philosophy of Nature and
Philosophy of Spirit from 1805-1806. Volume 5 will contain the System der Sittlichkeit
of 1802 and some previously unpublished manuscripts from 1801, used by Rosenkranz
in his 1844 biography, but only recently recovered. The import of these editions lies not
only in their bringing some new material before the public for the first time (in Volume
5) but also in their being the first critical editions of the later sections of the Jena
writings, texts which have been available since Hoffmeister's editions of the 1930s but
which were prepared by him in a way which often did considerable violence to the
1. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke Band 6: Jenaer SystementwUrfe I, ed. Klaus Dllsing and Heinz
Kimmerle (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1975); Gesammelte Werke Band 7: Jenaer
SystementwUrfe II, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Johann Heinrich Trede (Hamburg: Felix
Meiner Verlag, 1971); Gesammelte Werke Band 8: Jenaer SystementwUrfe III, ed. Johann
Heinrich Trede and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976).
2. K. Diising and H. Kimmerle, "Editorischer Bericht," Gesammelte Werke, vol. 7, pp.
340-357; Kimmerle, Das Problem der Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens. Hegel-Sludten Beiheft, vol.
8 (Bonn, 1970), pp. 248-264.
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original manuscripts. Indeed, in the case of the Logic, Metaphysics and Philosophy of
Nature contained now in Volume 7, Hoffmeister erroneously dated the work as
preceeding the materials now contained in Volume 6, thus giving rise to the
misinterpretation (shared by Lukacs, Marcuse, Plant and others) that this work in some
way forms the foundation for both of the lecture cycles, and setting off a good deal of
fruitless speculation as to how Hegel could descend from the conceptual sophistication
of the logic to embrace a more straightforward Schelling-type approach in the writings
from 1802-1804. It is also a period in which readers restricted to English translations
have recently been very well served. What is most likely to draw attention here is the
long-awaited new translation of the Phenomenology? For years those struggling
through Baillie's translation could blame the translation for the difficulties of the text
and console themselves with the illusion that it all must be easier in the original. A.V.
Miller's translation, though not always as resourceful or as consistent as those portions of
the Kenley Dove translation which have been published or privately circulated, avoids
the Victorian gear-grinding that marked too many of the passages in Bailie's rendering
and provides a text in which one may be reasonably certain that the difficulties and
obscurities one faces are those of the original. At times one may quibble with Miller's
choice of terms — the use of "Notion" for "Begriff instead of the more literal "Concept"
is one of the more annoying since it requires either the use of the horrendous "notional"
rather than the more sensible "conceptual" in the frequent adjectival uses of the term, or
breaking the consistency of the translation and hiding the fact that "Notion" and
"conceptual" are kindred terms. One may also regret the failure to provide an adequate
footnote apparatus to alert readers with some knowledge of German what in fact is going
on in the book, but perhaps such a procedure would be overly fussy in a translation
whose greatest virtue is the directness and lucidity with which it presents its message.
T.M. Knox's translation of the long essay from the Critical Journal of Philosophy on
Natural Law of 1802-1803 is even more impressive.4 The difficulties of the work in
German are legendary, and are matched only by the System der Sittlichkeit. Knox has
provided a remarkably readable and, for the most part, accurate translation — muddy
where Hegel is muddy, precise when he, in his own way, is precise. Notes from the
Gesammelte Werke version have been incorporated and provide the reader with some
notion of what passages in Kant, Fichte and others Hegel is in fact making reference to
in this rather tightly argued attack on Kantian and Fichtian approaches to social
contract theories. The one sour note of Knox's translation is a swipe (49) at Manfred
Riedel's extraordinarily helpful essay "Hegels Kritik des Naturrechts, "$ a study of the
transformation in Hegel's practical philosophy during the Jena period which points up
quite lucidly the methodological gulf which separates this essay of 1802 from the later
Rechtsphilosophie. Indeed, one can only feel regret that Riedel's essay was not
translated for use as an introduction to this edition. While the late H.B. Acton provides
a helpful summary of the argument and explains at least some of the theoretical
background in the writings of Kant and Fichte which is needed to come to terms with the
argument, his introduction is rather unhelpful when Hegel plunges headlong into the
terminology which he had taken over from Schelling and begun to reformulate.
3. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller with analysis of the text and foreword
byJ.N. Findlay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
4. G.W.F. Hegel, Natural Law, trans. T.M. Knox; introduction by H.B. Acton
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975).
5. Hegel-Studien, vol. 4, 1967, pp. 177-204. Reprinted in Manfred Riedel, Studienzu Hegels
Rechtsphilosophie (Frankfurt, 1969).
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Knox has also translated with Harris the companion piece to the Natural Law essay,
the 1802 System der Sittlichkeit^ Much of the deeper content of the Natural Law essay,
most especially the model of the ethical whole which Hegel begins to outline in the final
part of the essay, is simply gibberish without some knowledge of the theoretical
framework in which Hegel's reflections on natural law must be placed. But the
framework is hardly clearer than the worst moments of the essay itself. There are few
works in which one can become so totally lost as the System der Sittlichkeit. Being
apparently only a fragment of a larger system and thus starting in mid-stream with a
terminology which is totally unfamiliar, the essay contains some of Hegel's most detailed
reflections on political and social thought before the Philosophy of Right. Knox and
Harris have produced a translation to which even those who are familiar with the
German text will have to turn. Carefully rendered, abundantly noted and provided
with a superb index, the volume is prefaced by a lengthy interpretation of the essay by
Harris. At first glance ninety-eight pages may seem a remarkable act of self-indulgence
on the part of the editor and translator. But it is only those who have not tried their
sanity against this most cryptic of essays who will begrudge Harris his offer of help.
Harris has a clear sense of what one needs to know to make sense out of Hegel's
argument and has not shirked from providing it. Beginning with a discussion of the state
of the Hegel-Schelling "identity philosophy" at the time of the writing of the System der
Sittlichkeit, Harris provides an elucidation of the difficult terminology the work
employs and the not always clarified presuppositions upon which the work rests. While
the System der Sittlichkeit is hardly unfamiliar, having been discussed by Marcuse,
Plant, Lukacs, and Avineri in their studies of Hegel's political writings, Harris is one of
the first commentators in English to go beyond the by now rather tiring game of picking
out those passages where Hegel "anticipates" Marx and actually try to make sense out of
what Hegel is saying on his own terms. The central point of the interpretation lies in
demonstrating the significance which such notions as "Potenz" and "Indifference
Points" have within Hegel and Schelling's identity philosophy, thus elucidating the
structure on which the three parts of the manuscript hang. To turn the System der
Sittlichkeit into either an anticipation of Marx or a dry run for Hegel's own Philosophy
of Right is to misunderstand the radically different methodological and ontological
basis on which it rested. Here we do not have a dialectical progression of the sort which
one meets in the Philosophy of Right; we do not have a series of forms in which a concept
(in the case of the Philosophy of Right, "will") manifests itself until it at last finds an
adequate form. Rather, the organization of the System der Sittlichkeit is curiously
static, Potenzen representing those "levels" on which a Spinozistic whole reproduces
itself without ever dividing or parcelling itself out, while "Indifference Points" represent
the moments at which a sort of balance is obtained between a fluctuation of alternatives
which still owes more to Kant's antinomies than to Hegel's dialectic.
Harris' translation of the first Jena Philosophy of Spirit, the last third of the
manuscript contained in Volume VI of the Gesammelte Werke, is of a similarly high
quality, although here the decision has been made not to try to duplicate the accuracy
(and hence ambiguity) of the critical edition but rather to produce a more readable text
that Harris flatly terms "An Interpretation." Some questions may be raised as to why
Harris, if interested in producing a more coherent text, did not turn to translating the
second Jena Philosophy of Spirit (1805-1806), which is a good deal more coherent,
6. G. W.F. Hegel, System of Ethical Life (1802-03) and First Philosophy of Spirit (1803-04), ed.
and trans, by H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press,
1979).
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worked out, and, when all is said, probably a more compelling presentation of Hegel's
views on politics and society.7 The ultimate value of the first Philosophy of Spirit may lie
in its very incoherence: it betrays the titanic struggle in which Hegel was engaged as he
began to realize that there was a different and in many ways simpler manner in which
he could present his argument, a manner that ran against the organizing principles of
identity philosophy.
Less needs to be said about Harris' collaboration with Walter Cerf on two translations
of earlier published works: the so-called "Difference" essay (life is much too short to
trott out its full title) and the long 1802 article from the Critical Journal, "Faith and
Knowledge."8 Both are significant works, throwing a good deal of light on Hegel's first
embracing and further elaboration of Schelling's standpoint. The former, perhaps best
known for its powerful introductory section on the "Need of Philosophy" — Hegel's
earliest reflection on the relation between philosophy and the cultural milieu in which it
appears — includes Hegel's most concise elaboration of what he takes to be the basic
achievement of Schelling's system, which, if not the point of departure for his own
philosophy, is at least the philosophical system closest to him at the start of his
intellectual journey. "Faith and Knowledge" pushes the criticism of Kant and Fichte
first posed in the "Difference" essay even further and sets the stage for the resolution of
the breach between philosophical knowledge and religious faith that is one of the
primary motifsof the Phenomenology. Both essays provide us, then, with an insight into
the first steps Hegel took in displacing his theologico-politico project onto the domain of
systematic philosophy.
One can find a link between the Jena writings and what lay before simply because
Hegel drew it for us. In September of 1800 — shortly before writing Schelling that
well-known letter in which he announces that, having been forced to cast the ideal of his
youth in the form of a systematic philosophy, he is now wondering how it is possible to
return to an intervention in the lives of men — Hegel wrote a new introduction to the
abandoned "Positivity" essay. In addition to suggesting a new definition of positivity
that now encompasses Kant as well as Storr, Hegel notes that it is "obvious" that an
examination of the way in which the relation between God and man has been posed
within the evolution of Christianity "cannot be thoughtfully and thoroughly pursued
without becoming in the end a metaphysical treatment of the relation between the finite
and the infinite." Somewhat hastily he assures the reader, "But that is not the aim of this
essay. . . . , ' but it is assuredly a problem which occupies pride of place six months later
in the "Difference" essay. There, in his discussion of the way in which reflection has
become the main instrument of contemporary philosophizing, we find the philosophical
rewrite of the problem that had been plaguing him in Frankfurt: all philosophies that
rely on reflection in their effort to reach the absolute become ensnarled in a set of
contradictions that force the reflective intellect (Verstand) either to supplement
continually its limited truths to encompass more and more of a reality that is grasped
only as an infinite task, or to attempt a reflective apprehension of this infinite task,
which immediately results in the fixing of the opposition of finite and infinite in a way
7. A translation of this text, undertaken by Leo Rauch, will be published by Yale University
Press.
8. G.W.F. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy,
trans, anded. byH.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany, New York: State University of New York
Press, 1977); Hegel, Faithand Knowledge, trans, anded. by Walter Cerf andH.S. Harris (Albany,
New York: 1977).
9. Hegel, WerkeinZwanzigBdnden, ed. E. MoldenhauerandK.M. Michel (Frankfurt, 1971),
vol. 1, p. 225 (trans. byT.M. Knox as Hegel, Early Theological Writings [Chicago, 1948], p. 176).
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that nullifies the significance of the finite intellect's strivings {ifijj. vo).
The contradiction into which reflection enters here can best be understood as but one
specific case of the more general problem of the way in which philosophy emerges as a
result of tensions within a culture. Hegel's discussion of the "Need of Philosophy" in the
"Difference" essay thus provides us with both a striking example of the way in which his
theologico-politico project was recast and with a means of understanding the practical
significance he saw in the critique of philosophy that was launched at Jena. Hegel
argued that the need for philosophy arose "When the might of union vanishes from the
life of men and the antitheses lose their living connection and reciprocity and gain
independence" (Diff., 91). The evolution of Bildung — culture or education (Harris
renders the term consistently as the former and curiously translates Kultur as
civilization) — takes the form of a constant splitting up of the basic unity of the absolute
and a fixing of a given aspect in opposition to the rest of the absolute.10 The forward
evolution of 3ildung thus has generated such oppositions as "Reason and sensibility,
intelligence and nature and. . .absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity" (Diff.,
90). With the advance of Bildung the power of dichotomy becomes ever stronger, and in
the present age takes its ultimate form with the turning of Verstand against Vernunft
and the subsequent enthroning of reflective Verstand as reason itself (Diff., 92). Hence,
Hegel argues that to talk of "grounding" or of finding bases for philosophy within
philosophy itself (the program demanded by Reinhold, that bit of "contemporary
flotsam in time's stream" who serves as the point of departure for Hegel's reflections) is to
be confused both about the very possibility of providing some sort of Crundsatz within a
philosophical system (Diff., 103-106) and to ignore the fact that the process of
"founding and grounding gets going before, and outside, of philosophy" in the
diremptions brought about by the process of Bildung itself (Diff., 93-94).
Thus, if we are to speak of "presuppositions" for philosophy, they must be posed in
terms of "the need which has come to utterance" and are two-fold: (1) that the goal
sought by philosophy, the Absolute itself, must already be present, since otherwise it
would not be sought, and (2) that consciousness "has stepped out of the totality" and
thus provides us with a point of access to the Absolute. In Hegel's metaphor, which
returns in various guises throughout the Jena period, 'The Absolute is night, and the
light is younger than it. . . . " (Diff., 93). Common human understanding grasps only
this second aspect, and although on the level of "feeling" it still contains an intimation of
the Absolute, it remains a process in which single items are isolated which, like "points of
light that arise out of the night of totality," serve as guides for everyday activities (Diff.,
98-100). Faith, in contrast, grasps the Absolute but in the process nullifies consciousness
(Diff., 100). It represents a problematic attempt to restore some measure of unity to the
various dichotomies unfolded by Bildung, but at the price of extinguishing the intellect
itself. In the words of the Preface to the "Difference" essay, in which Hegel is already
glancing at the theme of "Faith and Knowledge," phenomena such as Schleiermacher's
Speeches on Religion represent the "need for a philosophy that will recompense nature
for the mishandling that it suffered in Kant and Fichte's systems" (Diff, 83).
The task of speculation, then, is to construct "conscious identity out of what, in the
consciousness of the ordinary intellect, are necessary opposites" and thus provide a
synthesis which is an "abomination to faith" (Diff., 100). Even as a failed system,
10. The peculiarity of Hegel's use of the term, all too frequently overlooked in discussions
which import the meaning the term had for writers such as Herder or von Humboldt into a reading
of Hegel, has been pointed out by RUdiger Bubner, "Problemgeschichte und Systematischer Sinn
der 'Phanomenologie' Hegels" now in Bubner, Dialektik und Wissenschaft (Frankfurt, 1973), pp.
15-16.
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speculation at least serves to heighten the dichotomies ofBildung and thus to bring them
more forcefully to the fore as dichotomies in need of unification (Diff., 102). The goal,
then, is to unite what Bildung and a "culture of reflection" have divided, and in this task
one cannot proceed by means of reflection, which has as its result only the elaboration of
a manifold of particulars in opposition to one another and to the Absolute. Rather,
"philosophy must aim to posit this manifold as internally connected, and there
necessarily arises the need to produce a totality of knowing, a system of science. As a
result, the manifold of these connections finally frees itself from contingency: they get
their places in the context of the objective totality of knowledge and their objective
completeness is accomplished" (Diff., 113). The "metaphysical" reposing of the
problem of positivity thus leads us to Hegel's embracing of systematic philosophy.
Having at least some sense of the general motive for Hegel's immersion in the various
system drafts of the Jena years, the problem becomes that of ascertaining what sort of
system Hegel has opted for. Here we may move to a brief consideration of two
interpretations of Hegel's activity during the Jena period, each of which proceeds from a
different end of the period and constructs a different reading of what are the aspirations
and lacunae of the Jena years. Harris' extensive introductions to the "Difference" essay,
"Faith and Knowledge," and the System der Sittlichkeit in effect provide us with a
200-page discussion of Hegel's early Jena system which takes its point of departure from
the sketch of identity philosophy elaborated at the end of the "Difference" essay. From
the other end of the Jena period, Otto POggeler has been led into a discussion of the
transformations of the Jena years out of an interest in clarifying the motivations for the
framing of a "Science of the Experience of Consciousness," subsequently recast as a
Phenomenology of Spirit.
Of Harris' three introductions, it is the one that prefaces his translation of the
"Difference" essay that will bear the greatest scrutiny here, just as he draws heavily on
its conclusions in his interpretation of the System der Sittlichkeit. In drawing out
the implications of Hegel's call for a speculative philosophy that will overcome the limits
of reflection by elaborating a coherently interconnected system, Harris relies on the
account of Schelling's system that forms the penultimate section of the "Difference"
essay. Schelling here is depicted as having found a way around the hypostatization of
one aspect of the Absolute that is the cardinal sin of reflection. Unlike Fichte, whose
philosophy fails to attain an identity of subject and object and instead is merely the
elaboration of a subject-object unity that remains essentially subjective — present in
consciousness but not in nature — Schelling's system incorporates both the "subjective
subject-object" of Fichte's transcendental philosophy and an "objective subject-
object" in the form of a philosophy of nature (Harris, Diff. Intro. 41-42; Diff.
155-161). Seeking to unravel the dichotomy of freedom and necessity that plagues
Fichte's practical philosophy and that is overcome only by posing the overcoming of
hetcronomy as an "ought," Schelling sought to draw out the implications of Kant's
analysis of teleology in the Critique of Judgment. But unlike Kant, who posed the
notion of a natural end as a regulative idea of knowledge, Schelling interpreted this
teleology as constitutive (Harris, System Intro. 14).
The result of this complementing of transcendental philosophy with a science of
nature was a system of philosophy that Hegel elaborates in his discussion of Schelling
as follows: transcendental philosophy, or as Hegel prefers to call it, the "science of
intelligence," maintains the primacy of subject over nature, while the philosophy of
nature maintains the dominance of nature over the subject. To that extent one can
denote the former as the sphere of practical philosophy, and the latter as the sphere of
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theoretical philosophy (Diff. 168). However, if the matter is pushed further it becomes
apparent that since both of these sciences are exploring the way in which a subject-
object differentiates itself into various domains, each science will have both a
theoretical and a practical part. Hence, within the philosophy of nature, there is, in
Harris' words, "a tension between the theoretical 'construction' of inorganic nature
and the practical 'reconstruction of the organism,' " while within practical philosophy
there is a similar tension between "the 'construction' of consciousness itself as the
capacity for theoretical cognition" on the one hand and "a fully practical part which
deals with the transformation of the natural world through the realization of
consciousness" (Harris, Diff. Intro., 50) on the other.
These two sciences are completed by a third phase of the identity system which sets
forth the Absolute shared by the science of intelligence and the science of nature. This
t;ikes the form of the so-called "resumption" of the whole in art and religion. To
understand the task of this final phase, some of the terminology of the system as a
whole must be elaborated. Central to the entire undertaking was the notion of Potenz,
literally "power" in the sense of mathematical computation. Faced with the question of
how an absolute totality can be developed and elaborated into various
lcss-than-Absolute entities without falling into diremption or one-sided reflection,
Schelling argued that "since the one being is indivisible, diversity of things is only
possible at all, insofar as it is posited as the undivided whole under distinct deter-
minations." These determinations, termed Potenzen, "change nothing whatsoever in
the essential being, which remains always and necessarily the s a m e . . . . ' The
absolute point of identity for the system is that "point of indifference" which
comprehends all Potenzen, and conversely also obtains within each individual Potenz.
Thus, the construction of the entire system resembles a maddening process of
balancing oppositions around null points within both the system as a whole — at the
point where art and religion develop an absolute identity — and within the various
individual sciences, each of which will be seen as a balance, homologous to the balance
of the whole, between freedom and necessity, subject and object, nature and
intelligence.
From this follows the often bewildering argument of the System der Siltlichkeit. For
the present we need only be concerned with the general form of Harris' interpretation
since it gives a more specific case of how one of the individual sciences is organized
according to the dictates of identity philosophy. Harris argues that the first part of the
essay must be viewed as the working out of the movement from "necessity" to
"freedom": from feelings embedded in man's material life to the family, the highest
community possible within the realm of feeling. The third section of the essay runs in the
opposite direction, from an abstract form of contractual unity to a more
differentiated, representative political order. At the null point between these two
movements is a remarkable section entitled "The Negative or Freedom or
Transgression" which runs through the various forms of destruction (from barbaric
invasion to the grudging acceptance of an enemy one cannot defeat) which can befall
a social order. Corresponding roughly to the final resumption of the system as a whole is
a discussion of religion, missing from the manuscript but possible to reconstruct on the
basis of Karl Rosenkranz's account, in which many of the themes of the theological
writings are posed once again (Harris, System Intro. 19-20).
11. Schelling, Philosophy of Art quoted in Harris, Diff. Introduction, pp. 53-54.
12. Karl Rosenkranz, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegt '; Leben (1844), Reprint (Darmstadt,
1963), pp. 132-141, trans, in System of Ethical Life. pp. 178-186.
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The virtues of Harris' approach to the System der Sittlichkeit should be evident.
Here at last we have a discussion of it which talks about the structure of the argument
itself and not about how much the commentator may be reminded of passages in Marx
as he plows through a text which is obviously otherwise unintelligible. Armed with this
general way of schematizing Hegel's argument, we can understand why certain themes
seem to be repeated in various sections — for instance, the discussion of the labor
process is broken up and assigned to a number of different Potenzen within the essay.
And in those cases when Hegel is less than clear or where the manuscript is clearly
lacking elaboration, we can come to some informed guesses about what Hegel was
trying to do.
The shortcomings of the interpretation may be less obvious, especially since it is so
far above anything that has been ventured in English to date. However, the effort to
reconstruct Hegel's early system on the basis of his account of Schelling's system is not
unproblematic. Indeed, an attempt to carry out an argument quite similar to Harris'
for the entire period from 1800 to 1804, Heinz Kimmerle's Das Problem der
Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens, has been severely criticized by Rolf P. Horstmann.
A few of Horstmann's points bear repeating since they are also applicable to Harris'
interpretation. Horstmann's general argument is that there is no compelling reason to
feel that Hegel was doing anything more in the penultimate chapter of the
"Difference" essay than the section title suggests: carrying out a "Comparison of
Schelling's Principle of Philosophy with Fichte's." While it is doubtless true that
Hegel's account of Schelling's system is in many ways a development and elaboration
of points which Schelling himself had scarcely worked out, and while it is also true that
Hegel's association with Schelling should not be viewed, as it is so often by Lukacs, as a
temporary fad which Hegel finally abandoned, there is a difference between the
account of Schelling's system which Harris takes as Hegel's own and other evidence
that exists about Hegel's own system of philosophy.
Horstmann develops two main points against the reading of Hegel's system
elaborated by Kimmerle: first, it fails to take note of a different account of the nature
of the Absolute in a contemporary published writing, the essay on natural law, and
second, it cannot account for the curious role played by Logic and Metaphysics in
Hegel's early system. With regard to the first point, Horstmann's case is as follows.
Within the Natural Law essay one finds a condensed account of the nature of the
Absolute and the relation of theoretical and practical sciences to this Absolute, which
is "irreconcilable with that brought forth in the'Difference'essay..." (95). Hegel here
works from the opposition of unity and multiplicity to show that both categories are
dependent on each other and remain in his terminology "ideal," and hence simply
different modes in which a unity between unity and multiplicity is posited. From this is
developed a schema of Natur and Sittlichkeit, which Natural Law expresses in
terms of a distinction between the relation of "indifference" (the condition of mutual
nullification) with "relation" (the condition of opposition). Hence, the Absolute is
viewed as manifesting itself in one of two forms of appearance: as physical nature, in
which one has a unity of indifference and relation in which multiplicity is primary
(which Hegel terms a "relative identity") and a unity of indifference and relation in
which unity is primary: ethical nature (Natural Law, 73). What Horstmann sees as
most important about this way of proceeding is that it allows for only two types of
13. R.P. Horstmann, "Probleme der Wandlung in Hegels Jenaer Systemkonzeption," in
Philosophische Rundschau, 19(1972), pp. 87-118. Further citations to this essay will be made in
the text.
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specialized sciences: a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of Sittlichkeit. It does
not. in his view, provide the basis or, for that matter, even the need for a third science,
a science of the absolute which would "resume" the two sciences at a higher level (96).
Second, Horstmann argues that Kimmerle does not explain adequately the role
played by a discipline denoted as "Logic and Metaphysics" in Hegel's early system. In
his course announcement for the Summer 1802 session, Hegel speaks of a discipline
called Logicam et Metaphyncam sive systema reflexionh rationis." Working on the
basis of the discussion at the start of the "Difference" essay, we can understand the
sense in which Hegel uses the term logic and why he sets it off from the metaphysics
only if we divorce all associations with the NUrnberg Science of Logic from our minds.
In 1802, logic served as an introduction to the entire system. Its task seems to have
been to articulate the limitations that reflection encounters and hence, as the
"Difference" essay argues, prepare the way for speculative philosophy. Thus
Horstmann locates the true innovation of Hegel's early Jena system here, at the very
start of the "Difference" essay, rather than in the explanation of Schelling's system.
The function of logic was to provide a path that reflection could take until it was ready
to enter into speculative philosophy, or in the terminology used here, metaphysics. At
that point one could begin from the identity equation which stands at the start of
systematic philosophy and then work one's way outward, developing the Philosophy of
Nature and the Philosophy of Sittlichkeit.
It should be apparent that there is a curious kinship between the Phenomenology
and this early Logic: both have as their task the raising of naive consciousness to the
level where truly philosophical thought can begin, and both begin by exploiting the
tendency of reflective thought to fall into an endless series of quandaries which
eventually force it to suspend itself. This relationship, sketched by Horstmann in his
critique of Kimmerle, has been developed more generally in Otto Poggeler's 1964
essay, "Hegels Jenaer Systemkonzeption."14 While the essay has to some extent
been supplanted by subsequent, more detailed studies of the period, it still remains
one of the more forceful and lucid elaborations of the path that led Hegel to the
Phenomenology, and its translation into English, like that of most of the other essays
in his collection, would be a most welcome event.
In Pbggeler's reading, an attempt to understand the basic motivation for the
Phenomenology must begin with the "Difference" essay and with that bit of flotsam
attacked therein, K.L. Reinhold. Reinhold was, in the early years of the new century,
one of the staunchest critics of the line of development of Kantian critical philosophy
that led to Fichte and Schelling. He viewed the end result of this development as an
unmitigated dogmatism, the elaboration of a system of philosophy that could not
escape from the "magic circle" of idealism but which remained trapped within its own
eternal self-reproduction, totally oblivious to any reality "outside" the circle. From
critical philosophy he turned to C.G. Bardili's Logic, and hailed it as the sort of
philosophizing that was needed: a methodological attempt to ground the reality of
cognition in some sort of fundamental proposition and then, working outward from
this, to deduce a comprehensive logical structure that would be grounded in reality.
Hegel, even though he rejected the solution that Reinhold offered and was rather
merciless in his treatment of the poor fellow in the "Difference" essay, proved not to
take the problem that Reinhold had pointed out quite so cavalierly as the criticism in
the "Difference" essay might suggest. Poggeler argues that as early as the account of
14. Now reprinted in Otto Poggeler, Hegels Idee einer Phanomenologie des Geistes
(Freiburg-Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 1973).
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the "Difference" essay, there are premonitions of the later criticism of Schelling: that
Schi'lling in effect has done no more than to juxtapose mechanically an "objective
subject-object" to the subjective subject-object which Fichte had provided. That the
juxtaposition was external and not adequately worked out is suggested by the necessity
of a post-factum "resumption" of the two systems in the science of the Absolute.
POggeler concludes, "That Hegel placed a logic and metaphysics at the start of the
system is the fundamental critique of Schelling; a lifting up, a systematic unfolding of
the speculative, which was not evolved for itself in Schelling's system — of this need
Schelling had no consciousness" (144). Hegel's decisive contribution was thus to bring
idealism to consciousness of its own peculiar task: to provide for a systematic
elaboration of all its categories (145).
Hegel's subsequent carrying out of this project forced a much more complete break
with Schelling than could have been predicted when Hegel first began working out
the consequences of this different approach to the Absolute. The first mutation occurs
by the time of iheJena Logic and Metaphysics of 1804-1805 (Cesammelte Werke Vol.
7). It has now become difficult to make a clear differentiation between logic and
metaphysics since it has become evident that the entire structure of reflection itself
already rests on a speculative basis. By 1806 Hegel has dropped the double title to this
section of the system and refers to it simply as Logic, and logic is now said to begin
within the realm of the speculative rather than within reflection. But this move leaves
Hegel without a propaedeutic.
To understand how it is that a "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" comes
to play this role, we must examine a related series of transformations which occur
within the study of Sittliche Natur and which eventually forced Hegel to frame an
authentic Philosophie des Ceistes. As early as the Natural Law essay and the
System der Sittlichkeit it is apparent that sittliche Natur had one decisive advantage
over physiche Natur: it was capable of bringing about, through the political order, a
form of reality that is adequate to its content in a self-conscious fashion. Unlike
nature, which strives to realize itself in the organism through an unconscious teleology,
the ethical realm is a realm of self-conscious action. It is for this reason that Harris'
reading of the System der Sittlichkeit may disguise an important tension. His
translation includes Karl Rosenkranz's account of the conclusion of the lectures on
Sittlichkeit which Hegel offered: here Hegel touches on the themes of folk religion, a
constant concern since his Tubingen days. Harris presumes this material would have
to be taken up again in the science of the Absolute, thus filling out the Schellingesque
scheme of the last part of the "Difference" essay (Harris, System Intro. 81-85). But, in
the absence of any manuscript materials indicating that Hegel in fact was working on
or planned to work on a science of the Absolute, a more interesting conjecture is
possible, and has been advanced rather cogently by Horstmann: Why assume that
Hegel ever intended to frame a science of the Absolute? Having developed the basic
speculative principle in his Metaphysics, what would be the need for a resumption at
the end? And if this is.true, could not the concluding portions of the System der
Sittlichkeit be seen as a working out of the dictum from the Natural Law essay that
"Ceist is higher than nature" by showing how it is first within the domain of Sittlichkeit
that one comes to the elaboration of the Absolute?
There remain some ambiguities to be worked out within the domain of the science
of Sittlichkeit before it can become, properly speaking, a Philosophy of Spirit. The
Jena manuscripts from 1803-1804 should not, in Horstmann's view, be called a
Philosophy of Spirit since here Ceist and consciousness are both introduced as
NOTES AND COMMENTARY : 125
determinants of Sittlichkeit. We do not yet see an immanent development of
absolute Geist out of the structure of self-consciousness. This had to await the
1805-1806 cycle where for the first time one sees an embracing of what Hegel was to
term in a notebook from the period "Fichte's contribution": "First through the history
of consciousness one knows what one has in these abstractions, through the
concept. . . . " T h e structure of consciousness thus provides philosophy with a series
of self-moving concepts: we have thus arrived at the decisive principle of the
Phenomenology of Spirit (Horstmann 110-117).
Present-day commentators have held the Phenomenology of Spirit in considerably
higher esteem than its first readers or, for that matter, the author himself. The book
was scarcely published before he began to criticize it. To Schelling, in the well-known
letter of May 1, 1807, he complained that a "wretched confusion" (unselige
Verwirrung) had infected not only the publishing, printing and distribution of copies,
but even the composition of the book itself. "I am curious what you will say about the
idea of this first part, which is really an introduction — for I have still not gotten
beyond the introducing, in mediant rem. — The working out of the details has, I feel,
harmed the overview of the whole, which itself, because of its nature, is such an
interlacing of hither and thither, that even if it had been better carried out, would still
cost me too much time until it stood clearer and more complete." And noting the
"greater lack of form" (grossere Unform) of the latter parts, he excused himself by
reminding Schelling that he "finished the editing around midnightjbefore the Batde of
Jena" (Briefe I: 161-162). In other letters he expressed hopes that a second edition
might enable him to clarify the organization of the book, but when he finally came to
prepare a new edition of the work, shortly before his death, he labelled it "A curious
early work, not revised — related to the time of its composition — in the Preface: the
abstract Absolute dominated at the time." 16
This time-boundness of the work seems to have been conveyed to Hegel's students,
who used the term "phenomenology" to denote those systems that remained trapped at
the level of "consciousness" with its separation of subject and object and thus did not
make the advance to true philosophical speculation. Rosenkranz's biography, while
more sympathetic to the work, sealed its fate: it was a product of Hegel's break with
Schelling and Fichte and while it did, with the attainment of the concept of Cent,
provide the appropriate philosophizing subject, it did not, as was the case in the Logic,
provide a system. Others, such as Rudolph Haym, were more hostile. He viewed it as a
mishmash of transcendental philosophy and history that "cannot be what it should be
and is not what it wants to be." Of the early commentators on the Phenomenology only
David Friedrich Strauss took a more tolerant stance, preferring the more open
approach of the not-yet unwiderlegte Weltphilosoph to the more systematic
utterances of the sage of Berlin. It was Strauss' comments that gave Marx his point of
entry into the work, and in the context of the book's initial reception, the care that
Marx devoted to the critique of the work in the Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts is indeed unique.17
The confusion prompted by the disorder of the work itself was only compounded by
Hegel's subsequent treatment of it. Originally conceived as the first part of a "System
of Science" which Hegel hoped to complete over the summer of 1806, some of the first
15. Werke in Zwanzig BUnden, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 559.
16. Phanomenologie des Geistes, ed. G. Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1952), p. 578.
17. For general discussions of the reception of the Phenomenology see Poggeler, pp. 170-188
and the forward to Hans Friedrich Fulda and Dieter Henrich, eds., Materialien zu Hegels
'Phanomenologie des Geistes' (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 14-23.
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editions of the work actually carry the original title page, which reads "System of
Science: First Part, the Science of the Experience of Consciousness." But while the
book was still in the publisher's hands, Hegel changed the title page to read "I. Science
of the Phenomenology of Spirit," a request that was not carried out in all extant copies
of the first edition. Some continued to carry the first title; others carried both. The
Preface to the first edition of the Science of Logic still claimed that the
Phenomenology was the first part of the System of Science, the Logic the second, and
the yet-to-be-published two concrete sciences, the Philosophy of Nature and the
Philosophy of Spirit, the completion of the system. But in an 1831 footnote, Hegel
stated that this system had now been replaced by the 1817 Encyclopedia and
announced that in the new edition of the Phenomenology the old title, "System of
Science: First Part" would be dropped. The lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,
however, still seem to leave an opening for the Phenomenology even within the
completed Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.20
The most damning later discussion of the book occurs in the Encyclopedia itself,
where, in the conclusion of the discussion of the "Preliminary Concept," Hegel
explained the confusion inherent in the Phenomenology in a way that was to greatly
influence subsequent discussions of the work. In distinguishing the method of
introducing naive consciousness to philosophy that was undertaken in the
Encyclopedia's discussion of the three attitudes toward objectivity from that taken in
the Phenomenology itself, Hegel writes, "In my Phenomenology of Spirit... the
method adopted was to begin with the first and simplest phase of mind, immediate
consciousness, and to show how that stage gradually of necessity worked onward to the
philosophical point of view, the necessity of that view being proved by the process. But
in these circumstances it was impossible to restrict the quest to the mere form of
consciousness. For the stage of philosophical knowledge is the richest in material and
organization, and therefore, as it came before us in the shape of a result, it
presupposed the existence of the concrete formations of consciousness, such as the
individual social morality, art and religion. In the development of consciousness,
which at first sight appears limited to the point of form merely, there is thus at the
same time included the development of matter or of the objects discussed in the special
branches of philosophy." Thus, the propaedeutic task of the Phenomenology would
seem, in the Encyclopedia, to be given over to the introductory discussion of the
attitudes towards objectivity, while Phenomenology itself, restricted now to a
discussion of consciousness, self-consciousness and reason, survives within the
Philosophy of Subjective Spirit as a science of consciousness which carries out the
transition from anthropology, a science which observes spirit while still immersed in
nature, to psychology, a discipline that deals with Spirit proper. Hence the feeling that
the Phenomenology of 1807 was somehow a mishmash of history and transcendental
philosophy did not have to wait for Haym to be expressed. On the basis of Hegel's own
treatment, one wonders if the work in fact had a coherent structure.
This state of affairs has given rise to a debate over whether there is a fundamental
break within the Phenomenology, a break that, in Werner Marx's way of posing the
problem, would in fact separate the two different titles given to the work by Hegel
18. See the editors'remarks to the edition in the Werke in Zwanzig Bdnden, op.dt., vol. 3, pp.
595-596.
19. Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (London, 1979), p. 29.
20. Hegel, Begriff der Religion, ed. G. Lasson (Leipzig, 1925), pp. 184, 171.
21. Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, para. 25 (Hegel's Logic, trans. W. Wallace
[Oxford, 1975], pp. 45-46).
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(x-xi).22 On the one hand, we have the authentic "Science of the Experience of
Consciousness" running up to and including the discussion of Reason, a science that
was later inserted into the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. On the other hand we have
a "Phenomenology of Spirit," an ambitious work that seeks to unfold the entire
content of the system of philosophy, beginning with naive consciousness, proceeding
through the domain of "Objective Spirit" with its discussions of politics and culture,
and culminating in an entry into what will subsequently be the triad of "Absolute
Spirit": art, religion and philosophy. Read in this way the Phenomenology would not
simply be an introduction to philosophy which leads one to the door of the Logic;
rather, the "authentic science of the spirit" with which the Phenomenology is claimed
to "coincide" is the entire Philosophy of Spirit itself.
In the face of the general reputation of the work in modern discussions it is perhaps
helpful to begin an examination of the problems of the coherence of the
Phenomenology with what must be the most blunt statement of the case for the
prosecution yet available in English — Michael Petry's introduction to his new edition
of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit.2* The book itself shows the same care that Petry
lavished on his edition of the Philosophy of Nature. Respect is paid to Hegel's
considerable immersion in the empirical sciences of his day by tracing the references,
taken from Hegel's unpublished lecture notes, to contemporary works in anthropology
and psychology and by explaining what empirical basis Hegel's systematic
reconstruction had in the sciences of his own day. Hegel's discussion of anthropology,
phenomenology and psychology from the Encyclope'dia of the Philosophical Sciences
and the introduction to the entire Philosophy of Spirit (in other works, paragraphs
377-482 of the third edition of the Encyclopedia) are offered in a new translation with
the German text on facing pages. Through the use of bold-faced type, those portions
of the text that date from 1827 or 1830 are distinguished from that part of the text that
was carried over unchanged from the first edition of 1817. Petry uses the Boumann
1845 edition of the Encyclopedia as the basis for the German text, and thus provides a
translation of Boumann's Zusdtze. But his edition goes beyond the Wallace-Miller
translation by also translating additional parts of the lecture transcripts from which
Boumann drew his ZusStze, and by translating Hegel's dictations to his class. Finally,
Petry has translated some material which was previously unavailable in any edition:
an 1822-1825 reworking of the early sections of the Philosophy of Spirit, apparently
undertaken by Hegel with the intent of publishing something equivalent to the
Philosophy of Right with respect to the section of his lectures on subjective spirit, and
the complete text of Griesheim's notes on Hegel's 1825 lectures on the Phenomenology
of Spirit.
Petry's long introduction expresses a heretical preference for the Encyclopedia's
version of phenomenology over the 1807 Phenomenology, and argues that it is within
the domain of psychology rather than phenomenology that Hegel made his most
important breakthrough. Petry's immersion in the more concrete side of Hegel's
22. Werner Marx, Hegel's Phenomenology: A Commentary on the Preface and the
Introduction, trans. Peter Heath (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).
23. Phenomenology, p. 58; this interpretation was advanced by Otto POggeler in a 1961 essay
"ZurDeutungder Ph&nomenologie des Geistes" now in Hegel's Idea. . ., op.cit., pp. 211-214. The
interpretation has subsequently been revised. See "Hegels Phanomenologie des Selbstbewusstseins"
in ibid., pp. 262-263 and "Die Komposition des Phanomenologie des Geistes," in Fulda and
Henrich, Materialien. .., op.cit., p . 351.
24. Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, ed. and trans, with an introduction and
explanatory notes by M.J. Petry, 3 volumes (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978). All citations in the text
will be to vol. I: Introductions.
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system stems from his feeling that "By concentrating upon the Phenomenology, the
Logic and what they thought were the general principles of the mature system...
the supposedly orthodox exponents of Hegelianism during the 1830s and 1840s laid
themselves wide open to the one-sided by incisively constructive criticism of Feuerbach
and Marx" (xiii-xiv). If Hegel's reflections on politics are not to be merely a
"parenthesis within the Logic," then it is not enought ot understand how the structural
arrangement of the Philosophy of Right corresponds to the Logic. Rather, one must
see how the category of will, so crucial to all of the subsequent Philosophy of Spirit, is
first elaborated within the psychology (xxi-xxii, xliv-xlvi).
Petry is considerably less enthusiastic about the Phenomenology. To use it as an
introduction for students to the system as a whole is "to run the risk of their never
finding a way out of the subject-object problems raised, it being so much easier to
fossick around in epistemology than to get down to the hard grind of mastering
empirical disciplines" (lxxxi). To argue that it marks a decisive phase in the evolution
of Hegel's thought is to ignore the fact that Hegel was a systematic philosopher before
and after the Phenomenology and although there are differences between the Jena
systems and the Berlin system "it is difficult to see how many of them relate in any way
whatever to what was accomplished in the Phenomenology" (lxviii). Its value consists
almost entirely in providing a critique of Kantian and Fichtean approaches to
philosophy. "Had Hegel been in as full a command of the Philosophy of Spirit as he
was when lecturing upon the Encyclopedia," Petry claims, "the treatment of
consciousness, the Phenomenology proper, would have been concluded with the
discussion of the identity of thinghood and reason" (Ixx). Thus, like Haering, who in
1933 argued that the Phenomenology of 1807 was in fact a palimpsest that should have
concluded with the section on reason, and in fact returns to its oi'g'r • form ••• thf
Nurnberg lectures, Petry sees the primary accomplishment of the Pht. ten*.
 OJ a*
being the overcoming of the antinomy of subject and object, an antinomy that is
resolved long before the book itself grinds to a halt.
There are clearly problems with Petry's approach, however enlightening it is to see
someone finally damn the monster rather than praise it, warts and all. The simplest
problem lies at the very point of contact with Haering's thesis: the no,ion that
somehow the abbreviated Phenomenology of Heidelberg and Berlin, already present
in the Nurnberg lecture notes, represents the core of the 1807 work, and that Hegel
was quick to realize this. The problem with this interpretation is that the philological
evidence for it is questionable. Petry still relies on Hoffmeister's edition of the
Nurnberg lectures, while Otto Pflggeler, in his critique of Haering's thesis in his 1961
article "Zur Deutung der Phanomenologie des Geistes" (now in Hegel's Idee. . .), had
indicated that Hoffmeister's edition of the Bewusstseinlehre ftir die Mittelklasse of
1808-1809 (the so-called "Harvard Manuscript") misreads certain crucial marginal
notations and obscures the fact that it was Hegel's original intention to lecture on the
entire Phenomenology, dividing it into three sections: A) The consciousness of
abstract objects (Ch. I-IV of the 1807 Phenomenology), B) The consciousness of the
world of finite spirit (Ch. VI), and C) Consciousness of Absolute Spirit (Ch.
VII-VIII).26 However, Hegel's students apparently could not follow him, and the
ambitious plan of lecturing on the entire Phenomenology was abandoned.27 Hence at
25. Theodor Haering, "Die Entstehungsgeschichte der Phanomenologie des Geistes,"
Verhandlung des 3. Hegelkongresses, ed. B. Wigersma (Tubingen, 1934), pp. 118-138.
26. These changes have been incorporated into the Suhrkamp edition of the Nurnberg
writings. See Werke in Zwanzig B&nden, op.cit., vol. 4, pp. 71, 74, 611.
27. POggeler, op.cit., pp. 199-203.
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least down to 1808 Hegel saw enough merit in the complete Phenomenology to
attempt a journey through it with his students.
It is, of course, possible to place aside the question of whether there was an
Urphdnomenologie that ended with the chapter on reason, and instead simply argue
that the work is more coherent if read in the shortened form. This indeed is the main
thrust of Petry's argument. A response to this sort of objection must show whether in
fact anything is to be gained by dragging the Phenomenology as a study of the
"experience of consciousness" out into a full blown "Phenomenology of Spirit" dealing
with matters which might more tidily be left to the study of the Objective and Absolute
Spirit. Werner Marx's 1971 book, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is now the most
readily accessible case for arguing that indeed there is a coherence to the work as a
whole. 'At first glance his study appears rather unpromising: yet another commentary
on the methodological statements which open the Phenomenology, it sidesteps the
more difficult task of explaining, at any given moment within Hegel's argument, what
exactly is going on. Furthermore, the book is best understood against the background
of a series of German discussions by POggeler, Hans Friedrich Fulda, Rildiger Bubner,
and Gadamer; with only the latter in English28 it seems unlikely that many readers
will know what Marx is talking about when he begins by stating that "In recent years
many of the old questions about the interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit
have again been revived" (ix). Neither the initial questions — posed by Haering,
Haym, et al — nor the revivals are very well-known to most English-speaking readers.
The merit of the book, however, lies in a discussion of two central methodological
problems of the Phenomenology that is lucid and compelling enough to make sense
even to those unfamiliar with the considerably more advanced level of German
discussion of the Phenomenology. The first problem discussed is that of the relation
between the "educational history" of consciousness, advancing from the level of
natural consciousness and phenomenal knowledge to that of Absolute knowledge,
and the educational history of Geist itself, which is traced in the discussions of cultural
forms which make up the bulk of the third section of the Phenomenology. The second
main theme of the book, given much less attention, is an examination of the function
of the "phenomenologist" himself, the narrative "we" whose introductions and
conclusions flank the actual presentations of the movement of consciousness. While
neither of these problems has been ignored in existing English-language literature on
the Phenomenology, Marx's detailed examination of the way in which these
methodological issues are handled in the Preface and Introduction to the
Phenomenology is far more rigorous than anything to have appeared to date.
At the heart of the first problem is the issue of the relation of the two parts of the
Phenomenology that forever threaten to fall apart: the tracing out of consciousness's
path, which proceeds through a series of shapes of consciousness, and the tracing out
of the path of Geist itself which involves shapes that are, in Hegel's words,
"distinguished from the previous ones by the fact that they are real Spirits, actualities
in the strict meaning of the word, and instead of being shapes merely of consciousness,
are shapes of a world" (Phenomenology 265). Marx sees the motive for this transition
from what has been in effect a "science of the experience of consciousness" to a
"Phenomenology of Spirit" proper as resting on Hegel's discussion of the type of
education (Bildung) which consciousness must receive. In the Preface, Hegel argues
that Bildung moves on two different levels: that of the individual consciousness and
28. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P.
Christopher Smith (New Haven, 1976).
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that of the "universal individual, self-conscious spirit." At any given stage the
achievements of the universal individual represent the "inorganic nature" on which
the individual consciousness rests, and hence the task of education at any point must
be the assimilation of this inorganic nature into the consciousness itself. This process of
education cannot thus be limited simply to an inventory of the shapes which appear to
consciousness in the course of the path of doubt and despair that culminates in the
realization, with the section on Reason, that subject and object are in fact one.
Rather, a more concrete, historical lesson must be added to that which is learned
within the immanent trajectory of consciousness.
The mixing of transcendental philosophy and history which Haym so abhorred thus
rests on the important modification Hegel made in Kant's transcendental unity of
apperception: it is not simply posited as existing, nor is it simply to be developed in a
history of consciusness of the sort outlined by Schelling and Fichte; it evolves
historically in the form of ethical nature, i.e., in the domain of objective spirit. Because
Hegel has de-centered transcendental subjectivity from the individual consciousness,
there is a need to push the path of the deduction of transcendental subjectivity beyond
the confines of the chapter on reason. Because individual subjectivity nevertheless rests
upon this transcendental subjectivity and indeed partakes of the standpoint achieved
by reflection-philosophy now as a prejudice of "natural consciousness," it is possible
for the Phenomenology of Spirit to take its point of departure from the "Science of the
Experience of Consciousness." Once the relation between consciousness and Geist has
been posed in this way it becomes clearer what has been lost in the truncated
Phenomenology of the Encyclopedia: the entire historical dimension in which the
development of Absolute knowledge has been situated in the Phenomenology. History
of course plays a role in the Encyclopedia, but it is a confined role, to be reached by a
path that leads from anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology, through most of
"Objective Spirit" until finally, after a discussion of the role of the state within the
realm of Sittlichkeit, we come to a discussion of "World History" whose contents must
struggle against the confines of the place it occupies within the system.
While the motive for the linking of a history of the experience of consciousness with
a history of Geist may be clearer by this examination, the question of how successful
Hegel was in realizing this goal remains. Such a question can probably not be settled
by a methodological examination of the Introduction to the Phenomenology (written
before the composition of the bulk of the text) which simply promises us that the
experience of consciousness will "comprehend nothing less than the entire system of
consciousness, or the entire realm of truth of Spirit," and the Preface, written after the
composition, which justifies the shift in the type of shapes that appear in terms of the
necessities of education. The burden of proof ultimately falls where Hegel insists it
would have to fall in any case, on the arrangement and coherence of the body of the
text itself. But there is one further methodological issue whose examination will do
much to shed light on the coherence of the text itself: the problem of the contribution
made by the phenomenologist who narrates the course taken by consciousness. Marx
argues that the function of the phenomenologist is five-fold: "The phenomenologist...
is in the first place he who takes phenomenal knowledge along on the road. Secondly,
he is the initiator of the movement of the history of experience, and hence also the
dialectical history of experience. Thirdly, by means of his superior knowledge, the
phenomenologist surveys the dialectical movement of experience and the category of
necessity underlying it, which makes possible the exoteric presentation, and hence the
justification vis-a-vis natural consciousness. Fourthly, as a result of the foregoing
NOTES AND COMMENTARY : 131
history of experience, there arises for the phenomenologist the synthesis positively
apprehended as principle. Fifthly, he can act as a guide for phenomenal knowledge"
(91-92).
The contribution in each of these cases is of a different magnitude. With regard to
the first and fourth, the function remains purely narrative and contemplative: the
phenomenologist lays out the history that consciousness has taken in a more coherent
form, thus elucidating the deeper significance of these events. This much has long
been apparent to commentators on the Phenomenology. The second point has been
noted by Kenley Dove in an article on Hegel's method that pointed out that the function
of the narrative "we" is anything but contemplative in the opening sections of the
book.29 Indeed, for there to be a dialectical movement at all, it is necessary for
natural consciousness to be forced to place itself in the paradoxes of the first chapter
which begin the journey down the path of doubt and despair (Marx, 90). The fifth
point, never well developed by Marx, can mean either that the phenomenologist
remains in the role of passive observer or, if it turns out that there is a need for further
prodding beyond the opening sections of the Phenomenology, plays the more active
role of setting up situations in which consciousness can confound itself, a role akin to
Emile's tutor, to drag out the ever-popular comparison. For our purposes, however, it
is the third of these functions that is most troubling and indeed it is here that Marx's
discussion enters into one of the more heavily worked regions of recent Hegel
scholarship.
In brief, the problem which many readers of Hegel's account of the experience of
consciousness doubtlessly have is that the shifts from one figure of consciousness to
another and the lessons learned in the process seem much more necessary and coherent
to the narrative "for us" than they do either to the suffering consciousness which is
undergoing all this torture or, more significantly, to the suffering reader of the book.
That the transitions may not be apparent for consciousness is of little account; the
narrative structure of the Phenomenology, with its constant for it-for us oppositions
presumes that some discrepancy like this is necessary, otherwise explanations about
what is going on would be unnecessary. But, if the accounts which are supposed to
hold true "for us" or "in itself do not ring true to a reader who has endeavored to
follow the argument, then a more serious problem arises. The necessity of a transition
can obviously not simply be assured by having the narrator of the account tell us that
the transition was necessary. The account must in some way be convincing to us.
As has been seen in the comments which opened the first installment of this review,
it is precisely here that Charles Taylor questions the successfulness of Hegel's account
in the Phenomenology. While Hegel, according to Taylor, provides us with an
indubitable starting point and gives a strict ontological dialectic in the first three
chapters of the book, once he moves beyond self-consciousness, we are left only with an
"interpretive or hermeneutical dialectic" which is convincing only on the level of
general plausibility, i.e., its ability to provide an account which "fits" (217-218).
Findlay, in his introductory comments to the new translation of the Phenomenology,
notices a related problem but is far more sanguine about the consequences. He implies
that the possibility of other types of accounts, the looseness which in general
characterizes interpretive or hermeneutic accounts, is not fatal to the Pheno-
menology. "There is no reason to think that Hegel thought that the path traced
in the Phenomenology, though consisting throughout of necessary steps, was the only
29. Kenley Royce Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method," in Review of Metaphysics, vol.
XXIII, n. 4 (1970), pp. 615-641.
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path that the conscious spirit could have taken in rising from sensuous immediacy to
Absolute knowledge. It was the main path that had been taken by the World Spirit in
past history. . . . But this involved no pronouncement as to what pathway to Science
would be taken by men in the future. . . . " Hegel, in brief, does not, in Findlay's view,
equate the necessary with the unique (vi).
Since the problem here is considerably broader than a debate about the argument
of the Phenomenology itself, it is worth bringing a few of these issues to light,
especially since they are taken up in this fashion in Raymond Plant's critique of Hegel's
attempts to bring about a reconciliation with reality by showing the necessity of what
exists. Plant's immediate target is Frithjof Bergmann's 1964 article, "The Purpose of
Hegel's System," which in turn is a critique of the equation of Hegel's notion of
necessity with strict logical necessity.30 Bergmann argues that Hegel has no intention
of meaning anything aproximating strict "deductive certainty" in his use of the term
"necessity." Rather, what Hegel inherits from Fichte is a conception of necessity as
"necessary for a purpose," in this case, a general account of what must be the case if
there is to be a coherent, harmonious account of an order which is not constituted by
thought, but is rather recollected and accounted for by systematic philosophy or
science. It does not follow from such an enterprise that there is only one system possible.
Indeed, as Petry shows well in his discussion of Hegel's reformulations of the various
parts of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Hegel's attitude towards the structural
arrangement of the material remained in a good deal of flux and was rarely as bound by
the structure of the Logic as is usually supposed. Hence, in Bergmann's
view, Hegel's demonstration of the "rationality of the world," his attempt to "prove
that it is a process with a purpose" is something which is "impossible to
demonstrate. . .with a few arguments or to derive. . .as a conclusion from several
premises. It is the sort of thing that can only be shown, and in order to show it one has
to specify the purpose and then indicate in detail how everything contributes to its
realization" (200). This, as the reader may have seen, is very close to Taylor's account
of the status of Hegel's historical or interpretive dialectics. But the crucial point of
Bergmann's argument is that it is wrong to assume that Hegel ever intended to provide
an account which had more than the sort of hermeneutic or interpretive plausibility
which Taylor maintains is simply not enough.
Plant's critique is most telling at the point which matters most to his argument: the
relation between necessity and reconciliation in Hegel's thought. Unfortunately, this is
also the point where Bergmann is most cavalier. Pointing to the continuity between
Hegel's early explorations of the dichotomies between God and man, and between
reason and emotions, Bergmann argues "it is these "disharmonies' that Hegel tried to
resolve in his attempts to go beyond Fichte and to demonstrate the rationality not only
of consciousness but of the world. It may seem strange that Hegel thought
demonstrating the rationality of the world was a way to achieve this. But one has to
remember that for Hegel the word 'reason' still had a magical sound" (196). This
clearly won't do, and this explanation of the relation between Hegel's early and later
stages is itself a rather "magical" way out of a problem which bears considerably closer
investigation. Plant's examination, however, is laden with its own difficulties.
At the heart of Plant's critique lies a rather untenable either-or. Either Hegel treates
the immanent teleology of consciousness coming to know itself through "natural and
social developments" as a "regulative idea" or the "teleology of consciousness. . .
requires some kind of metaphysical justification." Since the teleology of consciousness
30. Frithjof H. Bergmann, "The Purpose of Hegel's System," in Journal of the History of
Philosophy (1964), pp. 189-204.
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is not a mere regulative idea, as is apparent from Hegel and Schelling's
transformation of Kant's third critique, Plant is convinced that Hegel's notion of Spirit
or Absolute Idea "is really a metaphysical counterpart of the Christian God" and thus
provides the needed grounding for the teleology of consciousness. Since the idea stands
in a "creative relationship to the world" it can explain "how the necessary development
of consciousness is built into reality and how the philosopher eventually is able to grasp
it in its process of development" (132). As evidence for invocations of this "creative
relationship" in Hegel's work, Plant cites passages from the early paragraphs of the
Philosophy of Nature, the discussion of the "tragedy of Sittlichkeit" in the Natural
Law essay, and the linkage of the process of historical evolution with the rule of God in
the Introduction to Reason in History (132-133). One may quibble about the
adequacy of this evidence: the Natural Law essay, for instance, was written at a period
when Hegel still was under the sway of the Spinozism he shared with Schelling and in
any case is being deployed metaphorically to illustrate the concrete fact that the
ethical community must give part of itself over to the realm of material labor if it is to
survive. But even granting that Hegel does at times speak as if there is a creative and
hence metaphysical relation between idea and world, a rather compelling argument
may be raised against Plant's belief that Hegel's account of necessity rests on this sort
of basis.
It is possible to treat such grandiose statements as Klaus Hartmann has proposed in
his "non-metaphysical" approach to Hegel's system.31 Hartmann suggests that Hegel's
system includes certain "maximal claims" which violate what in fact is the minimal
and coherent heart of his system. What is coherent and defensible in Hegel is a "trans-
formation of what is found, or granted as a fact or as a deliverance of science or naive
philosophy, into a reconstruction in the form of rational necessity, or in a priori form"
(103). In this view, the dispute between Bergmann and Plant is off the mark; we are not
faced with a choice between Bergmann's "necessity for a purpose," the purpose being a
desire to provide a coherent account of the world, and Plant's metaphysically grounded
necessity. Rather, another alternative exists: a system of categories, generated by an
architectonic which stretches from "the zero case of categorization (being). . .to the
fulfilled case of categorization, where thought categorizes itself as having enclosed all
determination (concept)." Guided at each step by the alternative perspectives of
being-in-itself and being-for-itself it is possible to carry out a systematic "hermeneutic
of rationality" which involves neither metaphysical claims nor indeterminacy in the
outlining of the basic categorical structure (104-107).
The merit of Hartmann's proposal lies in its ability to give coherence to Hegel's
general project while enabling us at the same time to isolate cases where Hegel seems
to have overstepped the bounds he has set for himself in the far greater number of
cases where he is proceeding rigorously. Significantly, the overstepping occurs in
precisely the cases which interest Plant most: at moments when he personifies the Idea
of God and gives it a constitutive role to play in the passage from logic to
Realphilosophie and when history itself is introduced as a structuring force in the
Lectures on the Philosophy of History and in the discussion of Absolute Spirit. A
resolution of this discrepancy between Hegel's systematic achievements and his own
31. Klaus Hartmann, "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical
Essays, ed. A. Maclntyre (Garden City, New York, 1972), pp. 101-124. For an extension and
application of Hartmann's aproach to the Science of Logic, see the extremely suggestive
dissertation by Thomas J. Bole, Hegel's Science of Logic as a Transcendental Ontology,
unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1973 (University Microfilms
74-5198).
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self-understanding of what he was doing, expressed most ambitiously in passages like
those just noted, may have to be considerably messier than any of the parties involved
might be satisfied with. Hegel's system, considered "for us" or "in itself," can be
coherently reconstructed along the lines Hartmann has proposed without
metaphysical claims and indeed, pace Taylor, may remain an emminently serviceable
ontology. Hegel's emphatic and uncharacteristically desperate assertions that
somehow having possession of this ontology makes one feel reconciled to reality should
not perhaps be taken as the ultimate criteria for judging the success of his project, but
they do have considerable value as historical evidence of the concerns which he
was never able to integrate into his system. Hence, pace Plant, the failure of Hegel's
project of reconciliation requires no attempt to patch up his ontology with notions like
"loose entailments," since examined on its own terms, the ontology hangs together
fairly well. But that is not to claim that, on its own terms, the system can "reconcile" us
to reality.
This same tension between a systematically coherent, although somewhat austere
project, and considerably more passionate expressions that testify to some unsatisfied
practical imperative can be found within the Phenomenology itself. Even without
accepting Hartmann's "non-metaphysical" reading of the Logic it is possible to
understand what the Phenomenology is trying to accomplish without assuming that it
must produce an ascending dialectic that has the sort of ontological certitude that
Taylor demands. Objections to the Phenomenology that question whether there is not
a certain arbitrariness in the path it takes or even defenses of Hegel's arguments that
use the metaphor of "branching proofs" of mathematical problems both seem to
presume that the purpose of the Phenomenology is that of raising naive consciousness
to the level at which the Logic begins; in short, to move consciousness from one place
to another or, in Hegel's metaphor, to give us a ladder that lifts us into the first chapter
of the Logic. If the ladder could be pointed in a number of different directions, the critic
of the Phenomenology argues, how can we be sure that we have in fact reached a
secure starting point for the deduction of all that is? To which the defender of the
Phenomenology of the stripe of Findlay or Bergmann would retort: first of all the goal
is not to deduce everything, but rather to provide a rational account that allows for a
good deal of contingency and second of all, it doesn't matter what angle the ladder
happens to take, all that is important is that one comes to the goal of absolute
knowledge.
While the first of the defender's points is certainly correct, the second point is more
questionable, although understandable. The problem lies in the assumption, to be
sure encouraged by Hegel, that the point of the Phenomenology is to prepare one for a
reading of the Science of Logic. Despite the fact that few have been able to explain
exactly what the Phenomenology gives to the reader of the Science of Logic that he or
she might not have already had before wading into the former, it has been an article of
faith, at least until recently, that the Phenomenology is some sort of propaedeutic. But
what sort? The ladder metaphor is, on second examination, rather dubious here: what
can it mean to say that the Phenomenology "raises" consciousness to the level of the
Logic? Beyond the exhiliration (or relief) that one may have with the rush of the last
chapter of the Phenomenology, what is one supposed to carry from the
Phenomenology to the Logic?
The answer, on the basis of important work of Hans Friedrich Fulda and Johannes
Heinrichs, falls into two parts: (1) There is simply nothing that one takes from the
32. Hans Friedrich Fulda, "Zur Logik der Phanomenologie" in Fulda and Henrich, op.cit.,
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Phenomenology to the Science of Logic, composed in Nlirnberg. The goal of the
Phenomenology cannot be that specific system of categories. (2) However, if one looks
backward through the train of categories generated by the Phenomenology, the
outlines of a logic resembling that of the 1804-1805 Jena Logic and Metaphysics
becomes apparent. The working out of the specific character of the connection
between the Phenomenology and this logic is approached in a different fashion by
each, and a closer examination of Fulda's tightly argued article, let alone Heinrich's
massive study, would strain this already hefty review to the breaking point. To
summarize brutally: the significance of the approach which Fulda has suggested and
Heinrichs has to a large measure carried out lies in seeing the Phenomenology not
simply as a passage from the level of naive consciousness to the level of scientific
consciousness, but rather as an ordered sequence of levels each of which corresponds to
some portion of the Logic. To return to the ladder metaphor again, what matters most
in this reading is not that one ascends to the level of the Logic. Rather, what is
important about the ladder is, as it were, the spacing and organization of the rungs
over which one passes. At the end of the ladder one is not at some place which is of
particular significance, but one does have, by virtue of the very journey up the ladder,
an ordered sequence of categories that can now be re-expressed, no longer in the
language of consciousness and object which dominates the Phenomenology, but rather
in the pure "ether" of the Logic itself.
Form this perspective, the problem of the necessity of the stages through which one
passes takes on a different character. The notion that there can be alternative paths is
to some degree sustained, since presumably the specific content of consciousness's
experience could be different. But the logical rigor of the work, the categories that
correspond to the various Gestalten of Spirit which the book traces, are not simply
contingent. They must parallel in a much more precise way than has usually been
assumed the various stages of the logic itself.
What Fulda and Heinrichs have provided then is an approach to the
Phenomenology that breaks completely with the assumption, predominant in
German Hegel scholarship since Haering, that the unity of the book can only be
grasped historically and not logically. To the extent that German Hegel scholarship
runs the constant risk of becoming simply Hegel-philology (a state of affairs which, it
must be stressed, should not feed the smug satisfaction of the all too many English-
speaking commentators who seem to feel that such philological considerations are
beneath consideration) the new tack taken by Fulda and Heinrichs is a welcome one.
However, it is only fair to allow Poggeler a rejoinder here, since his objection to Fulda's
line of inquiry, while by no means vitiating the promise of a program which Heinrichs
has now made even more apparent, does raise a problem that parallels that which has
been noted with respect to Hartmann's "non-metaphysical" reading of the Logic. If
one examines, Poggeler argues, "how Hegel takes up the religious tradition and seeks
to resolve it or also is not able to resolve it with the newly arising emancipated society,
it must then appear as absurd, that the Hegelian accomplishment should be nothing
other than a clothing of logical moments in figures of consciousness."
In the face of these sorts of questions Pbggeler holds out for a philologically
informed philosophical reconstruction. In reply, Heinrichs suggests that the results
pp. 391-425. Johannes Heinrichs, Die Logik der Phdnomenologie des Geistes (Bonn: Bouvier,
1974).
33. Fulda, op.cit., p. 393.
34. Poggeler, "Die Komposition der Phanomenologie...," op.cit., pp. 372-373.
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from Poggeler to date have been a good deal of simultaneous ja und nein saying (88).
This sort of schizophrenia should not be confused with what goes on in the
Phenomenology proper, but it may be the standard occupational hazard of those who
try to take both the logical claims and the passionate language of the book seriously. I
must confess to the bad faith of being persuaded at one and the same time by both
POggeler and Fulda-Heinrichs. The logical rigor of the book is there, and
commentaries that simply repeat the content of the book in simpler form or become
embedded in the details of the argument fall prey to the very problem that Hegel said,
in his letter to Schelling, had befallen him in the composition of the book: the concept
of the book suffers at the price of an elaboration of the content. Equally, if one sees
anything of importance in the historical, political and religious studies that precede
the Phenomenology, it is impossible to be convinced that he was simply using this
material to generate a logical structure. It is not a reduction of philosophy to philology
to ask if the minimal logical program that one can take out of the Phenomenology is in
fact all that Hegel was trying to accomplish there. Or, if it was all he specifically set
out to accomplish, can we simply overlook the painfully obvious fact that his becoming
embedded in the details, his overly passionate language, or the political and
theological concerns that continually recur in the book seem constantly to be
reminding him of more ambitious tasks, temporarily (?) laid to one side while
preparing an introduction to the "authentic science of the spirit"?
In an important sense, the exploration of these sorts of problems seems to be best
facilitated by the confrontations of philological and systematic work . on the
Phenomenology that have been the hallmark of recent German Hegel scholarship.
Certainly, neither Fulda nor Heinrichs would deny that one of the most significant
insights in laying the foundations for the logical reconstruction of the Phenomenology
was the understanding of the proper function and dating of the Jena Logic and
Metaphysics manuscripts from 1804-1805. Conversely, one might hope that those
taking up the non-logical aspects of the Phenomenology, that is, those exploring the
ethical, political and religious themes within the Phenomenology, would pay some
attention to the systematic function of this material within the Phenomenology itself.
It is only this sort of awareness of alternative functions of any given part of the text that
will prevent either overly austere logical reconstructions or fast and loose sets of
variations on thematic materials ripped willy-nilly from the text.
Commentaries on the political and moral dimensions of the Phenomenology are
few in number. The bibliography provided by Fulda and Henrich in their
Materialienband notes comparatively little which could be so classified. Whe one does
come across an exploration of political or moral themes, all too often it is simply an
attempt to show how such general notions as alienation or objectification might be of
political import. Indeed, the tendency has been to follow Lukacs and reduce the
political import of the Phenomenology to an anticipation of Marx's analysis of
structures of alienated labor. What remains virtually ignored in all of this are the
detailed explorations of morality, culture and politics that make up the latter half of
the book.
Two recent studies are exceptions to this rule: Jonathan Robinson's Duty and
Hypocrisy in Hegel's Phenomenology ofMind3^ and Judith N. Shklar's Freedom and
Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind.
The former, a study of Hegel's critique of moral philosophy as found in Chapter VI of
35. (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
36. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
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the Phenomenology cannot be discussed here, although the work itself can easily be
recommended as a clear and lucid discussion of a portion of the Phenomenology which
should be quite accessible to students of ethics. The latter, which brings together a
series of essays written by Shklar over the last decade on themes in Chapters V and VI,
is of obvious importance to the concerns of this review — as much by what it fails to
accomplish as by what it actually does. The book is conceived as a commentary for
"students of political theory, both undergraduate and graduate, who have found
Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind incomprehensible and who might, with the help of a
guideline such as this, manage to understand it more readily" (ix). How well it
succeeds on its own terms is difficult to judge. Shklar provides a running commentary
on Hegel's discussions of "Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself
(V.C.), "Self-Alienated Spirit: Culture" (VI. B) and "Spirit which is certain of itself.
Morality" (VI.C). These discussions are preceded by an analysis of the comments
Hegel makes about the classical polis, which Shklar brings together from a number of
sections of the work. An introductory chapter sketches the general topography of the
book. Evaluating the success of the book as a commentary would require an extended
discussion of what one needs to know about the Phenomenology to make sense out of
it. Such a discussion will not be undertaken here, although it is worth raising the
question of whether the notorious difficulties of the Phenomenology are alleviated by
simply recounting what Hegel has said in a different way. Are not the more serious
problems the reader encounters not simply with what- Hegel is saying — which, while
occasionally opaque, is hardly as bad as is often claimed — as why he happens to be
saying this precisely at this point? If the latter is the case, then we need something
more than just a retelling of the story. We need a commentary that makes some rather
general systematic claims about the structure of Hegel's argument.
Other questions about Shklar's commentary will be pursued here. The book is a
discussion of those chapters of the Phenomenology that deal "with moral and political
ideas" (ix). But, if there are political and moral ideas in the Phenomenology, what are
they doing there? Given what we know from Fulda and Heinrichs, how can a discussion
of politics and morality advance Hegel's systematic argument? Given what we know
about Hegel's political writings from roughly the same period, what can be said about
their relation to the rather strange discussion of political themes that takes place
within the Phenomenology} In short, what is the relation of the discussion of these
political and moral themes in Hegel's Phenomenology to the practical and theoretical
philosophy of Hegel's Jena period?
These are not questions that Shklar poses. Indeed, her book seems to foreclose such
questions through a number of less than helpful moves. The reader is sent to Stanley
Rosen's book for "logical bearings" (xi), an unlikely division of labor in light of some
easily apparent discrepancies between what one is told in the two books.3lj There is
little attempt to relate the discussion of the Phenomenology to others of the Jena
writings on politics and morality. Indeed, some of the closing comments on the
difference between the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right present as
37. These comments are, of course, also applicable to the paragraph by paragraph
commentary provided by Findlay in the new translation of the Phenomenology.
38. Shklar, for example, find in the Phenomenology a challenging of "one of the most
fundamental assumptions of classical thought: the superiority of theoretical over practical reason"
(200) while Rosen in contrast argues in his book that Hegel gives primacy to the theoretical
accomplishments of the Logic (33, 185, 280-283). Likewise, Rosen's insistence on the apoliticality
of the Phenomenology (for instance pp. 183-184) points in a rather different direction than Shklar's
reading.
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transformations in Hegel's thinking positions that were already elaborated in the Jena
Entwiirfe but not taken up in the Phenomenology. And there is no attempt to
address the reader who is familiar with other versions of what the Phenomenology
might be about. Shklar avoids discussing how her argument differs from others in
hope that "the readers of this commentary will immediately turn to the
Phenomenology itself and then be in a position to cope with the outstanding disputes
and various readings directly" (xi).
It is probably only a reader unfamiliar with the present squabbles over what Hegel
was up to in the Phenomenology who can be very sanguine about some of Shklar's
characterizations of the book. She tends to refer to the method of the book as a sort of
"historical psychology" (8, 9, 43) without suggesting how this psychology is to be
differentiated from the psychology which stands juxtaposed to phenomenology in the
later systems. At one point she goes so far as to identify Hegel's discussions of "cycles of
self-consciousness" with his discussion of Geist (73), thus reconciling the tension
between the Phenomenology as a "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" with
the Phenomenology as "Phenomenology of Spirit" with a stroke of the pen. If this
sliding between consciousness and Geist and between psychology and phenomenology
were not troubling enough, other passages leave one bewildered as to what Shklar
expects us to find in Hegel's text. For instance, we are told at one point that "Proust's
remembering was. . .very much like Hegel's in design, a going inward to create a new
image out of the past. Proust's range was far greater. For though Hegel roamed over
all ages and Proust over just his own time, Hegel described the adventures of the
intellect, while Proust omitted nothing that men and women can experience. His was
the more universal phenomenology of the soul" (55). What this has to do with Hegel's
project of a phenomenology of spirit is anyone's guess.
In short, it is not clear that Shklar takes the systematic claims of the Phenomenology
very seriously and thus, from the start, any confrontation between the structure and
the content of the Phenomenology is ruled out. She cites with sympathy Josiah Royce's
dictum "In the presence of the wayward, I too may be free to judge in my own
individual way" (5). It is hardly good advice, and fortunately Shklar does not always
follow it. But we are told that "Hegel's work is an incomplete map which we are free to
fill out and redraw in our own time and place" (56). It is suggested that the book
"might well have ended" with the close of Chapter VI (203) — apparently sparing the
reader the chapters on Religion and Absolute Knowing, where the level of reflective
thought (Vorstellung), the animus of the Preface, is finally overcome. In short, the
attitude toward those aspects of the Phenomenology that touch on issues other than
politics is casual at best.
This casualness is unfortunate, since Shklar's discussions of the political content of
the Phenomenology are by far the most extensive and quite often the most sensitive
explorations of those concerns now available. For that reason it is worth seeing how far
we can go in forcing some of the issues she has sidestepped. A point of departure can
be taken from Jean Hyppolite's Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of
Spirit — a book which, strangely, is not even mentioned in Shklar's account. In the
introduction to his discussion of Hegel's chapter on Geist, Hyppolite poses the issue of
S9. For example, the discussion of legal personhood in the Philosophy of Right is contrasted
with that in the Phenomenology (Shklar, 205-206) without noting that parallel discussions of
personhood, without the pejorative associations which accompany the term in the Phenomenology
were present as early as the first Jena system (G.S., vol. 6, p. 326; the point is considerably
developed in subsequent drafts, see G.S., vol. 8, p. 231ff.)
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the status of political analyses in Hegel's Phenomenology rather concisely with a
contrast of positions advanced by Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Busse in the 1920s and
1930s.40
Rosenzweig41 sees the Phenomenology as somewhat anomalous in the development
of Hegel's writings on politics. In it Hegel abandons the conception of the state as the
most exalted form of human community that had been elaborated in the System der
Sittlichkeit and the natural law essay. According to Rosenzweig, pride of place now
goes to morality and religion, which would appear, on the basis of the
Phenomenology, to represent higher forms of community (326-328). Hyppolite rejects
this rather suspect reading, which in effect posits not one but two rather dramatic
ruptures in Hegel's thinking about the role of the state. "We would have to agree that
there was a break between Hegel's earlier work and the Phenomenology and the later
work. According to this view, the idea of the human city. . .is abandoned in favor of a
City of Cod. Later, the argument continues, Hegel returned to his divinization of the
state" (327). Clearly, this cumbersome an argument has little to recommend it. In
response, Hyppolite advances Busse's case: The Phenomenology is viewed as having a
position that is fundamentally identical to that of his later Philosophy of Right.4^
Apparent differences in the two works are accounted for by noting their rather
different concerns. The Philosophy of Right, as a part of the Encyclopedia, is
concerned with the articulations of the moments of the system without attention to the
prise de conscience that lies at the heart of the account of the Phenomenology
(329-331). Hence though the Phenomenology may cover some of the same terrain as
the later system, it will do so from a different perspective and (as perhaps Hyppolite
does not stress enough) with a different intent. The Phenomenology is concerned with
the experience which consciousness undergoes and which Spirit makes, and hence
must present its materials in terms of a structure that plays off the perspectives of "for
consciousness" and "in itself." It does so with the intent of providing a prolegomena to
a system (although assuredly, a system that in all likelihood would have been different
from that eventually published in 1817), not an outline of the system itself.
Hyppolite is also keenly aware that there was something fundamentally new at stake
in the Phenomenology, even if it could not be posed in as simple a fashion as
Rosenzweig had suggested. Discussing the System der Sittlichkeit and the natural right
essay, Hyppolite notes, "Despite the beauty and validity of certain passages, these
works of Hegel's seem oddly archaic. The polis and the Platonic ideal mingle with
18th-century states in a completely unhistorical exposition" (331). Certainly, in these
writings new wine is literally being poured into old bottles. Both works are dominated
by the dichotomous opposition of household and polity which Hegel seems to have
taken over from Aristotle's Politics and sought to restore on the basis of the chiasmus of
spirit and nature in identity philosophy. Hence, both works face the problem of fitting
into this archaic structure the radically modern domain of economic exchanges that
take place outside the confines of the household, yet which represent essentially private
activities. Needless to say, the results are not happy ones: modern economy is either
conceived rather unconvincingly as analogous to the householding of the ancients (the
40. Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. S.
Cherniak and j . Heckman (Evanston, 1974), further citations will be made in the text.
41. Hegel und der Staat (Oldenburg, 1920).
42. Martin Busse, Hegels Phdnomenologie des Geistes und der Staat (Berlin, 1931). Busse(the
name is spelled incorrectly in the translation of Hyppolite; there is no umlaut) was one of the
leading Fascist interpreters of Hegel's political thought. See also the companion volume by Julius
Binder, Martin Busse and Karl Larenz, Einfilhrung in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie (Berlin, 1931).
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argument of the natural law essay) or its components are broken up and assigned to
both the public and private sides of the opposition (as appears to be the case in the
System der Sittlichkeit). ' Matters are not helped by the persistence in these essays of
invocations of long-vanished classes: the Aristotlean politeuieun in the natural law
essay, and the class of priests, and elders in the System der Sittlichkeit44
Hence the Phenomenology would seem to represent for Hyppolite not so much an
explicit rejection of certain earlier political claims as a fundamental rupture in the
metatheory in whose terms Hegel frames arguments about politics. "As he discovered
his originality with respect to Schelling. he became aware of the necessity of the prise
de conscience, and he contraposed the concept to intuition. From that moment on,
the ideal of the ancient city was relegated to the past. The substantive spirit of
antiquity became the modern spirit, and history no longer appeared alien to the
absolute idea" (331-332). With this recognition, the demise of the ancient poll's
became the irrevocable price of the emergence of self-conscious forms of political
community.
Shklar's account does not fall into the same obvious errors as Rosenzweig's. While
she does not develop his real insight and note the apparent peculiarity of this
discussion of politics in which all of the typical themes of Hegel's earlier political
writings (especially the concept of representation by estates) are absent,45 she does not
share his error and take the Phenomenology to be elaborating a positive doctrine of
politics on its own. Rather than outlining the rational structure of the modern state,
the task of the Phenomenology is, in Shklar's view, fundamentally negative. "It shows
with utmost clarity what the modern state is not like and what degree of civic integrity
had once been possible" (76). In place of a discussion of the present political order, we
have a meditation on a departed one, the classical polis. "If much of the
Phenomenology is a lament for Hellas, that is not due to pure nostalgia, but mainly to
Hegel's polemic against the false consciousness of subjectivity and isolation" (85). The
polis is a counter image against which to measure modern society. It is not capable of
being revived (73, 12, 39-41).
The center of gravity of Shklar's account is the exploration of the way in which this
vision of the ancient polis is marshalled against the disintegration of the modern
public realm. She is keenly alert to the peculiar character of Hegel's neo-classicism.
Unlike the majority of his German contemporaries, his vision of Greece was more
political than aesthetic, while unlike the more political visions of antiquity that could
be found within the non-German republican tradition, his preferred political order
was Athenian rather than Spartan or Roman (13, 74, 88, 90, 142). While these
comments may underestimate the extent to which other German Grecophiles were
conscious of the political dimensions of the polis and while Shklar may have
underestimated the extent to which Hegel could at times manifest simultaneous
loyalties to both the polis and a Machiavelli-inspired vision of the republican state,
43. Werke in Zwanzig BUnden, vol. 2, pp. 481-495 (Natural Law, 93-104); System of Ethical
Life, pp. 129-131.
44. Werke..., op.cit., vol. 2, p. 489 (Natural Law, 100); System of Ethical Life, op.tit., p.
158.
45. The point is discussed in Poggeler, "Die Komposition. . .," op.cit., p. 332. See also the
comprehensive study by Rolf K. Hocever, Stdnde und Representation beim jungen Hegel
(Munich, 1968).
46. Henry Hatfield has stressed the role of studies of Greek political life in the education of
students at Gottingen in his Aesthetic Paganism in German Literature (Cambridge, 1964), p. 194;
for the importance of Machiavelli, see Otto Poggeler, "Hegel et Machiavel. Renaissance Italienne
et Idealisme Allemand" in Archives de Philosophie, vol. 41, n. 3 (1978), pp. 435-467.
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these comments are for the most part very much to the mark. By spelling out the
specific character of Hegel's attachment to the polis, she avoids dissolving his Hellenic
vision into that of his contemporaries.
But, when all this is said, it still seems that Shklar's claim that Athens represented to
Hegel the sole image of what a free life (38-41) — as opposed to the independent life of
modern man — could have been like seems to overstate the case, just as her
characterization of the Phenomenology as "his elegy to that world of freedom" (208)
seems to misread the thrust of the work. However caustic Hegel's views might be on the
pretensions of autonomous subjectivity, he never views it simply as an irrevocable curse
that forever separates us from the polis. It is the fate of modern times, and as Hcgcl
argued in his inaugural thesis at Jena: "Principium scientiae moralis est reverentia
fato habenda" (Werke II, 533). His reverence for the fate is expressed in one of the
more beautiful passages of the Phenomenology. Reflecting on how, with the collapse
of the religions of the polis, we are left with statues which "are now only stones from
which the living soul has flown" and how hymns "are words from which belief has
gone." his elegy for Athens turns into a striking affirmation of modernity: "But, just as
the girl who offers us the plucked fruits is more than the Nature which directly
provides them. . .because she sums all this up in a higher mode, in the gleam of the
self-conscious eye and in the gesture with which she offers them, so too the spirit of fate
that presents us with those works of art is more than the ethical life and the actual
world of that nation, for it is the inwardizing in us [Er-innerung, recollection] of the
spirit which in them was still outwardly manifested; it is the spirit of the tragic fate
which gathers all those individual gods and attributes of the (divine) substance into
one pantheon, into the Spirit that is conscious of itself as Spirit" (Phenomenology 456).
The construction of a pantheon — the task assigned to the mythical Theseus of Hegel's
thcologico-politico treatise — is now the work of history, a work that has been
accomplished and which leaves us, by the very act which separates us from the
Hellenic world, with that capacity for self-reflection that places us above it and allows
us to internalize it.
The Phenomenology is not so much an elegy for Hellas as an exorcism of Hegel's
own obsession with Athens. It is an apolitical work which, as Shklar notes, "ends when
philosophy reaches its goal which lies beyond law, morality and religion" (208). But
the later works Hegel writes about politics must be seen as the sequel to this journey.
Hegel does not, as Shklar claims, "ask us simply to forget the lost world and to accept
the rules such as they are" (208). He has rather come to the point where he can see the
way forward for an elaboration of a systematic political theory which rests no longer on
an attempt to imitate the grounding of the polis on "natural Sittlichkeit" but rather
builds the modern state within the "world of Geist," whose boundaries are first
sketched within the Phenomenology. As George Armstrong Kelly has argued in a
paper on Hegel's debt to Schiller's Aesthetic Letters now reprinted in his Hegel's
Retreat from Eleusis,^ "in post-classical society, politics will have to emerge in a new
way. The state will have to mediate what was once 'immediate,' much in the same way
that speculative thought will have to reorder, recover, and remember those harmonies
that were once direct and felt. . . . The turn toward politics is correlative to the turn
coward philosophy. . . .the aesthetic state of absolute Sittlichkeit is impossible. That
imposMbility makes necessary a politics and a state mediated by thought" (S'2. 86).
This ihen is the task which is set for the Philosophy of Right: a state which ICMN on
Geist. mil natural ethical life, a state which is consciously mediated by thought.
47. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
